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Optimal health insurance design
Health insurance has two important advantages for the con-
sumer, but also two disadvantages (see Table 1 below). On 
the one hand, health insurance reduces the financial risk for 
the insured and provides access to health care that would 
otherwise be unaffordable [2]. On the other hand, insurance 
increases costs due to loading costs—the administrative and 
other expenses of the insurer—and moral hazard. In relation 
to dental care, perhaps more so than in relation to other types 
of care, a choice is possible between cheaper basic treat-
ments and more expensive ‘luxury’ treatments (e.g., placing 
a metal crown versus a porcelain crown), which may result 
in substantial moral hazard (both consumer- and supplier-
induced moral hazard).
Optimal health insurance should maintain the advantages 
and reduce the disadvantages as much as possible. First, it 
should reduce the insured’s financial risk as far as possible. 
Because trivial risks lead to losses that can be borne by the 
insured without any noticeable burden, optimal insurance 
should not provide coverage for trivial risks. This avoids 
relatively high administrative expenses and loss settlement 
costs (loading costs) that are very high for these risks com-
pared with the pure risk premium.
Secondly, optimal insurance should provide ‘access to 
health care that would otherwise be unaffordable’. This 
implies that cover limits should be avoided and expensive 
care should be covered as much as possible.
Third, the optimality of CDI can be increased by restrict-
ing the loading costs of dental insurance by increasing insur-
ers’ efficiency.
Fourth, to reduce moral hazard, optimal insurance should 
involve cost-sharing arrangements such as deductibles 
and co-insurance, and apply managed care. A deductible 
makes the enrollee responsible for all costs up to a defined 
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Introduction
In Europe, on average 70% of total expenditure on dental 
care is private expenditure and 16% of this private expendi-
ture is covered by complementary dental insurance (CDI) 
[1]. However, most CDI products currently on the market 
in Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands are not 
optimal because (1) they provide little protection against 
financial risk and do not improve access to otherwise unaf-
fordable dental treatment (e.g., implants and crowns) and 
(2) moral hazard and adverse selection are not sufficiently 
counteracted. The suboptimal character of CDI can be 
explained by supply-side aspects (the limits of insurability) 
and demand-side aspects (behavioral economics). On the 
basis of these potential explanations, strategies will be drawn 
to optimize dental insurance.
We begin by presenting a framework for optimal insur-
ance design, as well as the current situation of CDI in Bel-
gium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.
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threshold. A co-insurance rate makes the enrollee respon-
sible for a percentage of costs. Optimal insurance con-
tracts should also have a stop-loss, a limit on out-of-pocket 
expenses [3].
Fifth, optimal insurance should also counteract adverse 
selection as much as possible. Adverse selection occurs 
when the insured knows more information about his 
expected losses than the insurer knows or uses in his pre-
mium setting and underwriting process. Adverse selection 
can be counteracted by selective underwriting (using medi-
cal questionnaires), risk rating (setting higher premiums for 
groups presenting high risk, e.g., age-related) and product 
differentiation (designing benefits so to attract lower risks).
The features of optimal health insurance are summarized 
in the first column of Table 4.
Complementary dental insurance in Belgium, 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands
Complementary dental insurance (CDI) provides coverage 
for care that is either not covered or not fully covered by 
the mandatory basic insurance (MBI). In the four countries 
studied, private expenditure on dental care (i.e., not covered 
by MBI) expressed as a percentage of total expenditure on 
dental care ranges between 30% in Germany and 74% in the 
Netherlands (Table 2). CDI represents 3% (Belgium) to 55% 
(Netherlands) of total expenditure on dental care. Out-of-
pocket expenditure on dental care is the highest in Belgium 
(42%) and the lowest in the Netherlands (19%).
The coverage provided by CDI is complementary to that 
provided by MBI, which covers 26% (the Netherlands) to 
70% (Germany) of total expenditure on dental care. Table 3 
provides an overview of the dental care covered by MBI in 
the four countries.
No optimal dental insurance
Currently, CDI offered in Belgium, France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands cannot be described as ‘optimal’ (Table 4). 
German CDI responds best to the criteria of optimal health 
insurance.
Only in Germany are there no upper limits on coverage 
for dental care (after an initial period). CDI in the other three 
countries does not provide access to otherwise unaffordable 
health services and protection against unpredictable high 
financial risks. For example, replacing four teeth by implants 
and crowns can cost about €10,000. Upper limits of only 
€250 (the Netherlands) or €1000 (Belgium) do not provide 
protection against high financial risks nor do they make 
this kind of dental care more accessible. In France, even 
the most extensive complementary covers provide a maxi-
mum amount of only €750 per year for implants. With total 
costs for an implant easily amounting to about €2500, €1750 
still needs to be paid for out-of-pocket after complementary 
insurance has kicked in. In all four countries, CDI provides 
coverage of trivial risks.
In all four countries, cost sharing is applied, but only in 
the form of co-insurance. Co-insurance rates vary between 
0 and 50% in Belgium, 0 and 55% in Germany, and 0 and 
25% in the Netherlands. In France, co-insurance is generally 
not used. In Germany and the Netherlands, many products 
are offered with 0% co-insurance. Deductibles are not used. 
Caps on out-of-pocket expenses, which protect the consumer 
against high financial risk, are not applied in any of the four 
countries studied.
Selective underwriting is primarily used in Germany, 
and to a lesser extent in the other three countries. In Bel-
gium, selective underwriting is used by only one insurer 
offering CDI. In France, where a 7% tax has to be paid for 
contracts that apply selective underwriting, most CDI con-
tracts abstain from selective underwriting. In Germany, a 
medical questionnaire needs to be filled out for most CDI 
products. The insurer can decline to cover the candidate or 
charge an additional premium or exclude missing teeth or 
the use of certain techniques from the scope of coverage. 
Insurance products without selective underwriting usually 
have contractual clauses excluding reimbursement for prob-
lems that existed well before the start of the contract and 
for treatments running at the moment of the conclusion of 
the contract (‘pre-existing conditions’). In the Netherlands, 
selective underwriting is rarely applied (only for the high-
end dental coverage).
In all four countries, risk rating and product differentia-
tion are used to a certain extent (e.g., age-related premiums). 
Products are designed and marketed to attract certain market 
segments.
In all countries except Belgium, preferred provider net-
works are used as an element of managed care for CDI. In 
all countries, waiting times are used as a means to contain 
costs and to counteract adverse selection.
Why is dental insurance suboptimal?
Both supply-side aspects (the limits of insurability) and 
demand-side aspects (behavioral economics) may explain 
why dental insurance is not optimal.
Table 1  Advantages and disadvantages of health insurance
Advantages Disadvantages
Reduction of financial risk for the insured Loading costs
Access to health care that would otherwise be unaf-
fordable
Moral hazard
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Limits of insurability
A potential explanation of why insurers offer suboptimal 
CDI is that optimal CDI exceeds the limits of insurability. 
According to Berliner [4], risks properly belong in the area 
of insurability where: (1) losses occur with a high degree of 
randomness; (2) the maximum possible loss for the insurer is 
limited; (3) the average loss amount upon loss occurrence is 
small; (4) the average time interval between two loss occur-
rences is small (i.e., losses occur frequently); (5) the insur-
ance premium is sufficiently high; (6) there is virtually no 
possibility of moral hazard; (7) coverage of the risk is con-
sistent with public policy; and (8) the law permits the cover.
Public policy (7), moral hazard (6), the degree of ran-
domness of losses (1) and the maximum possible loss (2) 
are important issues as far as the suboptimality of CDI is 
concerned.
Public policy plays an important role in Belgium, France, 
and the Netherlands, where the ‘solidarity’ principle is 
paramount in health care financing. Equal access to health 
insurance is at the heart of the values of the mutual insurers 
(‘mutuelles’) established in those countries. Their goal is 
to organize solidarity between their members for the reim-
bursement of health care costs. According to the French 
‘Code de la mutualité’, medical questionnaires may not be 
used by mutuals and thus selective underwriting cannot be 
applied. The solidarity idea is not restricted to mutuals. In 
France, for instance, a 7% tax is due when selective under-
writing is applied. So, commercial insurance companies are 
encouraged by the French government not to apply selective 
underwriting. In Belgium as well, the government intervenes 
in the organization of CDI. Premium increases for existing 
clients are strictly regulated. Premiums can only be adjusted 
in line with the consumer price index or a specific ‘medical 
index’ for dental care, which is calculated annually by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Table 2  Dental care: 
expenditure and insurance
Source: [1]
a As share of total expenditure on dental care
b Authors’ estimate
Belgium France Germany Netherlands
Average expenditure per person on dental care €150 €160 €314 €179
Private expenditure (i.e., not covered by MBI)a 45% 65% 30% 74%
Complementary dental insurance (CDI)a 3%b 43% 5.4% 55%
Percentage of population with CDI 5% 95% 18% 62%
Table 3  Dental care covered 
by mandatory basic health 
insurance
+++: good coverage
++: medium coverage
+: low coverage
−: no coverage
a Extra billing is possible
b Conservative dental care is covered for children only (under age 18)
Belgium France Germany Netherlands
Conservative care (e.g., fillings) +++a +++a +++ +b
Orthodontics (e.g., braces) + + ++ −
Prosthetics (e.g., implants, bridges, crowns) − + + −
Periodontics (gum disease treatment) + + ++ −
Table 4  Complementary dental insurance: presence of features of 
optimal health insurance design
−: The feature is not present in CDI products offered
+: The feature is present in CDI products offered
a Selective underwriting is applied only for a limited number of con-
tracts, i.e., those with the highest upper limits on coverage
Belgium France Germany Netherlands
No upper limit on cover-
age
− − + −
No coverage of trivial 
risks
− − − −
Deductible − − − −
Co-insurance + − + +
Cap on out-of-pocket 
expenses
− − − −
Selective underwriting −a −a + −a
Risk rating + + + +
Product differentiation + + + +
Managed care − + + +
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Fear of reputational damage and the wish to avoid (fur-
ther) restrictive regulation being adopted may help to explain 
why (commercial) insurance companies in Belgium, France, 
and the Netherlands refrain from applying ‘hard insurance 
logic’ such as selective underwriting. By offering limited 
coverage, which is equally accessible for all citizens, insur-
ers willingly refrain from applying private insurance logic. 
Rather, they apply ‘social security mechanisms’ (open enrol-
ment, no selective underwriting, community rating). Insur-
ance companies may be concerned that the unfettered appli-
cation of insurance logic could provoke a reaction from the 
regulator. In a market where it is impossible or very difficult 
for mutuals to engage in selective underwriting, commercial 
insurance companies applying selective underwriting could 
easily be accused of ‘cherry-picking’. By sticking to social 
security-type mechanisms, insurance companies err on the 
safe side. However, insurers’ reluctance to apply private 
insurance logic (such as selective underwriting) and reliance 
on other methods (such as setting upper limits on coverage) 
lead to the development of suboptimal CDI products.
Moral hazard is an important problem due to the very 
nature of dental care. Choices among different treatment 
options are strongly influenced by individual consumer pref-
erences, where aesthetic aspects often play a role. Dentists 
also have their preferences, which can be influenced by the 
consumer’s and insurer’s ‘willingness to pay’. Dental insur-
ance can thus provide fertile ground for both consumer- and 
provider-induced moral hazard. Therefore, in an optimally 
designed scheme, insurers ought to fully invest in coun-
termeasures. However, classic private insurance measures 
such as deductibles and co-insurance are not or are not fully 
implemented due to public policy concerns. Rather, insurers 
prefer to use other measures such as offering restricted cov-
erage, setting upper limits on coverage, and not applying a 
cap on out-of-pocket expenditure. However, this contributes 
to the development of suboptimal CDI products.
The degree of randomness of losses varies between total 
randomness and absolute predictability. Pre-existing condi-
tions come close to being absolutely predictable. In Bel-
gium, France, and the Netherlands, CDI covers pre-existing 
conditions. Consequently, adverse selection is inadequately 
counteracted and a vicious circle arises whereby the insurer 
needs to repeatedly increase premiums to be able to con-
tinue coverage for the high risks that have subscribed the 
insurance policy. This leads to the development of subopti-
mal CDI products [5]. By comparison, in Germany, CDI is 
effectively limited to future, unforeseen events. It may not 
be a coincidence that CDI in Germany generally provides 
unlimited coverage, in contrast to the situation in Belgium, 
France, and the Netherlands.
The ‘maximum possible loss’ is also a potential expla-
nation for the sub-optimality of CDI. Certain dental treat-
ments, i.e., prosthetic treatments such as the replacement of 
multiple teeth, constitute a risk with a relatively large loss 
amount (more than €10,000) and a low loss frequency. Such 
risks can only be made insurable if the insurer is given the 
opportunity to build up long-term loss reserves from its pre-
mium income. However, CDI contracts can be cancelled by 
the insured every year. Uncertainty about the duration of the 
contract together with moral hazard and adverse selection 
may lead insurers to limit coverage, resulting in suboptimal 
dental insurance.
Behavioral economics
Van Winssen et al. [6] explored potential explanations of 
why individuals choose suboptimal complementary health 
insurance. Based on key insights from behavioral econom-
ics, they discuss several factors that can have an impact on 
the high uptake of suboptimal insurance by consumers. For 
CDI, the following factors are relevant.
Factors such as liquidity constraints and debt aversion 
may help to explain why people buy dental insurance prod-
ucts that provide only limited coverage. Liquidity constraints 
imply that individuals do not have the means to free up (sub-
stantial) funds at a given point in time. Debt aversion stems 
from mental accounting theory [7] and is illustrated by indi-
viduals’ preference to prepay for consumption and to get 
paid for work after completion.
Ignorance and social comparison may also affect individ-
uals’ willingness to purchase suboptimal insurance. People 
often do not know exactly what they are insuring themselves 
against by taking out complementary dental insurance (see, 
e.g., [8]) and they often do not know the costs of dental care 
that is (not) covered by their insurance. They often rely on 
what their peers decide [9].
Strategies for optimizing complementary dental 
insurance
In many countries, MBI does not cover certain types of den-
tal care such as prosthetic treatments (e.g., crowns, implants, 
and bridges) or provides only limited coverage (see, e.g., 
Table 3). With 70% of total expenditure on dental care being 
privately financed in Europe, CDI can play an essential role 
in the affordability and accessibility of dental care. There-
fore, it is important for CDI products to respond as closely 
as possible to the features of optimal insurance design. 
However, currently, many CDI products on the market are 
suboptimal. The gap with optimal insurance design can be 
explained by both supply-side aspects and demand-side 
aspects. From these potential explanations, the following 
strategies to optimize CDI can be drawn.
First, public policy would like voluntary CDI products to 
provide both optimal insurance coverage and equal access 
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to insurance. However, this is not possible because optimal 
insurance requires selective underwriting and risk rating 
(to counteract adverse selection to protect existing clients 
against free riders who abuse the insurance system), which 
is inconsistent with the principle of equal access. Therefore, 
policymakers should carefully decide which types of dental 
care are essential and ought to be covered by MBI. Dental 
care that is considered non-essential by policymakers and 
that is therefore not covered by MBI should be subject to 
private insurance logic. If, because of budgetary constraints, 
essential dental care cannot be covered by MBI, subsidiza-
tion of private insurance for persons with low incomes might 
be an alternative to full public provision.
Second, moral hazard could be counteracted by the sys-
tematic use of deductibles and co-insurance. Standard lists 
of usual market prices could be compiled (as, e.g., in the 
Netherlands and France) and provider networks adhering to 
a price list could be created. Insurers should not shy away 
from legal action in case of excessive amounts being claimed 
(i.e., excessive extra billing).
Third, selective underwriting and risk rating could be 
used to counteract adverse selection and to protect existing 
clients against free riders who abuse the insurance system. 
Providing insurance for pre-existing conditions is incompat-
ible with the insurance principle that only future, unforeseen 
risks can be covered: a burning house cannot be insured.
Fourth, applying waiting times for expensive treatments 
such as prosthetics and providing only limited coverage dur-
ing the initial years of the contract constitute alternatives to 
a general limitation of coverage. For instance, in Germany, 
limited coverage typically applies during the first 4 years of 
the insurance contract.
Fifth, behavioral economics aspects such as liquidity con-
straints and debt aversion could be dealt with by offering a 
combination of optimal dental insurance in combination with 
a health (dental) savings account. The dental savings account 
could be used to finance trivial costs. In this way, CDI could 
be optimized and would not be tainted by attempts to also 
cover trivial risks. Ignorance and social comparison can be 
taken care of by improving the transparency of CDI prod-
ucts. Consumer organizations can play an important role in 
clarifying the market offer for the consumer.
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